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Chapter 1
Classical Calculability.
In this chapter we’ll introduce the classical model of computability with some of
its limitations. To complete such a task successfully is needed a brief description of
the Turing Machine (we’ll call it TM from now on) and a specification of its power.
Following that, we’ll introduce some variations of this model and their qualities.
In the last part of the chapter we’ll analize the phisical steps of the TM and the
phisical limits imposed on them.
1.1 The Turing Machine.
The TM is an ideal machine which, given a well defined set of rules, manipulates1
data contained in an infinite tape.2 The tape can be seen as a sequence of squares
in each of which is possible to write a symbol ai taken from a finite predetermined
alphabet A. In every moment in time the TM is in a determined state of mind si
taken from a finite predetermined set of states S.
Formally, one can say that a TM T is a structure of the form:
T = 〈S, s0, F, A, δ〉
where:
• S is the set of the possible states of mind of the TM.
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state of the TM.
• F ⊆ S is the set of the final states of the TM.
• A is the alphabet used by the TM.
• δ : S × A→ S × A× {l, n, r} 3 is the transition function of the TM.
1Reads or writes via a scanning head.
2In some cases it is said that the tape must not be limited; in other words, is required the
possibility of adding more tape if it might be necessary.
3This set indicates the movements of the scanning head: left, no movement, right.
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The instructions of the machine are quintuples like the following:
〈si, αi, sj, αj,m〉
which are equivalent to:
δ(si, αi) = 〈sj, αj,m〉
For more information on the subject the interested reader could consult [6].
1.2 The Church-Turing Thesis.
In this section we’ll make an analysis of the Turing Thesis. To do so, we’ll make a
detailed analysis of the §9 of the paper of Turing, [44].
The TM is, basically, an abstraction of the operations made by humans who
calculate. From the description given to the TM, one is sure that it is a not
intelligent mechanical object. As we will see later, the elementary operations of
the TM can hardly be further simplified. The real problem is the completeness of
the formalization, as one can understand from the following quote:
No attempt has yet been made to show that the ‘computable’ numbers
include all numbers which would naturally be regarded as computable.
All arguments which can be given are bound to be, fundamentally,
appeals to intuition, and for this reason rather unsatisfactory mathe-
matically. The real question at issue is "What are the possible processes
which can be carried out in computing a number?" [44]
Each formal description proposed for the class of the effectively computable
functions with mechanical means comes with the problem of establishing not only
its adequacy, but also the completeness of the description towards a non formally
described set. Does the TM compute all the numbers that are naturally com-
putable? Given a number, what are the possible operations to manipulate it?
Demonstrating that a TM computes all the numbers that are naturally com-
putable is a problem on which, as Turing said in the aforementioned quote, all
arguments which can be given are bound to be appeals to intuition, making them
rather unsatisfactory mathematically. That’s why we pay attention to the mecca-
nical, effective, operations needed for the computation of a number.
The arguments which I shall use are of three kinds.
1. A direct appeal to intuition.
2. A proof of the equivalence of two definitions (in case the new
definition has a greater intuitive appeal).
3. Giving examples of large classes of numbers which are computable.
Once it is granted that computable numbers are all “computable” sev-
eral other propositions of the same character follow. In particular, it
follows that, if there is a general process for determining whether a
formula of the Hilbert function calculus is provable, then the determi-
nation can be carried out by a machine. [44]
1.2. THE CHURCH-TURING THESIS. 3
From this quote, one can perceive by intuition where Turing is trying to go. Be-
ing the TM a mechanical object which executes atomical operations4 and succeed-
ing in producing arguments in favor of the fact that all the naturally computable
numbers are computable in a mechanical way by a human being, we can deduce
several things, for example that if one can prove that a function is calculable, if
there is a process during which it is calculated, this process can be executed in
a mechanical way by a TM. By contrast, if it can be established that a TM can
not solve a given problem then neither a human being operating in a mechanical
manner can solve it.
Turing, as noticed by Sieg in [41], analyzed the human being that was calcu-
lating mechanically. Once the steps of the calculations were identified, Turing (in
[44]) made them atomical so that it was possible an infinity of combinations of
them to make an infinite amount of calculations.
The necessity of the atomicity of the possible operations that the machine can
make is explained by Turing himself in the following quote:
I. [Type (a)]. [ . . . ] Computing is normally done by writing certain sym-
bols on paper. We may suppose this paper is divided into squares like a
child’s arithmetic book. In elementary arithmetic the two-dimensional
character of the paper is sometimes used. But such a use is always
avoidable, and I think that it will be agreed that the two-dimensional
character of paper is no essential of computation. I assume then that
the computation is carried out on one-dimensional paper, i.e. on a tape
divided into squares. I shall also suppose that the number of symbols
which may be printed is finite. If we were to allow an infinity of sym-
bols, then there would be symbols differing to an arbitrarily small ex-
tent. The effect of this restriction of the number of symbols is not very
serious. It is always possible to use sequences of symbols in the place of
single symbols. Thus an Arabic numeral such as 17 or 999999999999999
is normally treated as a single symbol. Similarly in any European lan-
guage words are treated as single symbols (Chinese, however, attempts
to have an enumerable infinity of symbols). The differences from our
point of view between the single and compound symbols is that the
compound symbols, if they are too lengthy, cannot be observed at one
glance. This is in accordance with experience. We cannot tell at a
glance whether 9999999999999999 and 999999999999999 are the same.
[44]
Turing begins with analyzing the way a human being normally calculates, that is
by writing symbols on paper, and seems like he tries to analyze the essential aspects
of it. Note that he does not analyze what happens in the human mind, he never
refers to the human intellect. He tries to simulate the mechanical actions of the
human being that calculates without taking into account the cognitive processes
that take place during the calculation. We already see in the first lines of his
analysis that Turing takes into account a one-dimensional tape as support for the
calculations and not bi-dimensional one. In so doing, he eliminates the facilitations
4Operations which are not furtherly semplifiable.
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that the positional notation brings to the calculation process from a human being.
Those facilitations can be seen as mainly cognitive as they do not add “power” to the
calculation, the amount of functions that can be calculated in one-dimensional tape
are the same as the amount of functions that can be calculated in a bi-dimensional
paper (even though the mechanical steps made to calculate the same function may
differ depending on the support that is used, but that does not concern us right
now). From this point onward seems like Turing is slowly taking out of the model
the human being from the model.
After that, he proceeds with an analysis of the set of symbols used during the
calculation process, the alphabet of the machine if we prefer. That set must be
a finite one and for a good reason. If we allow an infinity of symbols to be used
then, from some point onward, the symbols will become too similar to one-another
and distinguishing one symbol from the other could be very difficult. It’s better if
the symbols can be easily identified. By combining these symbols one can obtain
an infinity of other compound symbols. An example that explains this concept are
numbers. We can represent an infinity of numbers just by combining a fixed set of
“primitive numbers”. We usually use a set of 10 numbers to represent all numbers:
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
If this set becomes too big it may become difficult to distinguish one element from
the other, for example 12121212121212 and 1212121212121212. A second analysis
of the symbol may be necessary.
The behavior of the computer at any moment is determined by the
symbols which he is observing. and his "state of mind" at that moment.
We may suppose that there is a bound B to the number of symbols or
squares which the computer can observe at one moment. If he wishes to
observe more, he must use successive observations. We will also suppose
that the number of states of mind which need be taken into account is
finite. The reasons for this are of the same character as those which
restrict the number of symbols. If we admitted an infinity of states
of mind, some of them will be “arbitrarily close” and will be confused.
Again, the restriction is not one which seriously affects computation,
since the use of more complicated states of mind can be avoided by
writing more symbols on the tape. [44]
The above-mentioned considerations can be also applied to the set of “states of
mind” of the machine. Also, it’s supposed that the number of observable symbols
at a time is a finite one. If one desires to observe more than that quantity then
consecutive observations are needed.
We can notice here a further attempt to simplify the model. Everything is de-
scribed in terms of finite “symbols”5 and finite “states of mind”. These restrictions,
as Turing pointed out, do not reduce the power of the machine.
5Which may or may not have a particular meaning, the only concern is for them to be easily
distinguishable from one-another.
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Let us imagine the operations performed by the computer to be split
up into "simple operations" which are so elementary that it is not easy
to imagine them further divided. [44]
At this point it becomes explicit Turing’s attempt to make the operations the
most simple ones possible.
Every such operation consists of some change of the physical system
consisting of the computer and his tape. We know the state of the
system if we know the sequence of symbols on the tape, which of these
are observed by the computer (possibly with a special order), and the
state of mind of the computer. We may suppose that in a simple
operation not more than one symbol is altered. Any other changes can
be set up into simple changes of this kind. The situation in regard
to the squares whose symbols may be altered in this way is the same
as in regard to the observed squares. We may, therefore, without loss
of generality, assume that the squares whose symbols are changed are
always “observed” squares. [44]
As indicated in the quote from above, and as easily verifiable, the state of a
TM is known once the following are known:
1. The sequence of symbols written on the tape.
2. The observed symbol.
3. The current state of mind.
One can notice that the machine is working more and more in a mechanical way.
Each operation can be composed from simple alterations of the tape. The tape, as
one can easily notice, is the sole component of the machine the content of which
is mutable after the calculation has begun. The set of symbols and states of mind
are not mutable.
Besides these changes of symbols, the simple operations must include
changes of distribution of observed squares. The new observed squares
must be immediately recognizable by the computer. I think it is rea-
sonable to suppose that they can only be squares whose distance from
the closest of the immediately previously observed squares does not
exceed a certain fixed amount. Let us say that each of the new ob-
served squares is within L squares of an immediately previously ob-
served square. In connection with ‘immediate recognizability’, it may
be thought that there are other kinds of square which are immediately
recognizable. In particular, squares marked by special symbols might
be taken as immediately recognizable. Now if these squares are marked
only by single symbols there can be only a finite number of them, and we
should not upset our theory by adjoining these marked squares to the
observed squares. If, on the other hand, they are marked by a sequence
of symbols, we cannot regard the process of recognition as a simple
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process. This is a fundamental point and should be illustrated. In
most mathematical papers the equations and theorems are numbered.
Normally the numbers do not go beyond (say) 1000. It is, therefore,
possible to recognize a theorem at a glance by its number. But if the
paper was very long, we might reach Theorem 157767733443477; then,
farther on in the paper, we might find ‘... hence (applying Theorem
157767733443477) we have...’. In order to make sure which was the
relevant theorem we should have to compare the two numbers figure
by figure, possibly ticking the figures off in pencil to make sure of their
not being counted twice. If in spite of this it is still thought that there
are other ‘immediately recognizable’ squares, it does not upset my con-
tention so long as these squares can be found by some process of which
my type of machine is capable. [ . . . ]
The simple operations must therefore include:
(a) Changes of the symbol on one of the observed squares.
(b) Changes of one of the squares observed to another square within L
squares of one of the previously observed squares.
It may be that some of these changes necessarily involve a change of
state of mind. The most general single operation must therefore be
taken to be one of the following:
A. A possible change (a) of symbol together with a possible change of
state of mind.
B. A possible change (b) of observed squares, together with a possible
change of state of mind. [44]
In addition to the manipulation of the symbols contained in the tape the “com-
puter”6 must also move the tape to read the next symbol. To facilitate this op-
eration it is assumed that the next square of the tape is distant not more than L
units.7
Considering the assumptions made so far, we come to the conclusion that the
mecanichal operations that a “computer” can make are of two types:
• A possible reading/writting of a symbol from/in the observed square of the
tape with a possible change of the state of mind.
• A possible change of the observed square with a possible change of the state
of mind.
If we could draw an analogy, the calculation model proposed from Turing is,
so far, similar to a musician playing a musical instrument. In order to render the
explanation more comprehensible let’s take for example a musician playing a piano
in front of an audience. The written notes and the sound of the notes constitute
the alphabet of the machine. The notes written in the copybook and given to the
6The computer here intended is the human being that is calculating.
7L is intended as a finite quantity.
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musician before the performance constitute the input of the calculation procedure.
The pressing of the keys and the consequent sound produced by the piano constitute
the result of the calculation procedure and the resulting melody constitutes the
result of the calculation procedure. The creation of the melody is something not
related to the instrument, the instrument is needed only in transforming the notes
given as input in a melody. The possible physical operations in this case are:
• The reading of the notes given as input.
• Press the key associated to a given musical note and eventually read the next
symbol.
The operation actually performed is determined, [ . . . ], by the state
of mind of the computer and the observed symbols. In particular,
they determine the state of mind of the computer after the operation
is carried out. We may now construct a machine to do the work of
this computer. To each state of mind of the computer corresponds
an "m-configuration" of the machine. The machine scans B squares
corresponding to the B squares observed by the computer. In any
move the machine can change a symbol on a scanned square or can
change anyone of the scanned squares to another square distant not
more than L squares from one of the other scanned squares. The move
which is done, and the succeeding configuration, are determined by the
scanned symbol and the m-configuration. The machines just described
do not differ very essentially from computing machines as defined in §2,
and corresponding to any machine of this type a computing machine
can be constructed to compute the same sequence, that is to say the
sequence computed by the computer. [44]
Taking into account all the assumptions afforementioned, we notice that the
calculation process can easily be mechanized. As a matter of fact, each instruction
of the machine can be represented as a tuple.8
As has been suggested above, Turing has analyzed and simplied to the maxi-
mum the mechanical operations a human being executes when calculating, without
taking into account its intelligence.9 As a result of this operation he got some ele-
mentary operations which, combined with one-another, can produce more complex
operations. Obviously, if the calculation process10 of a number ends in a finite
amount of time and returns the desired result then the corresponding function is
calculable, otherwise it may not be so.
By analysing the second point:
II. [Type (b)]. If the notation of the Hilbert functional calculus is
modified so as to be systematic, and so as to involve only a finite number
8The choice made in this work is to represent each instruction as a 5-tuple, however, anyone
who knows the TM, even if just a little, knows that they can be represented by different tuples.
9Which, so far, is a characteristic of the human being.
10Made-up from a combination of such elementary operations.
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of symbols, it becomes possible to construct an automatic machine K
which will find all the provable formulae of the calculus. . . .
. . .When sufficiently many figures of P have been calculated, an essen-
tially new method is necessary in order to obtain more figures. [44]
it becomes clearer, from a mathematical point of view, what is calculable and what
is not.
In the third point, Turing introduces another mean which substitutes the “state
of mind”:
III. This may be regarded as a modification of I or as a corollary of II.
We suppose, as in I, that the computation is carried out on a tape; but
we avoid introducing the “state of mind” by considering a more physical
and definite counterpart of it. It is always possible for the computer to
break off from his work, to go away and forget all about it, and later
to come back and go on with it. If he does this he must leave a note of
instructions (written in some standard form) explaining how the work
is to be continued. This note is the counterpart of the “state of mind”.
We will suppose that the computer works by such a desultory manner
that he never does more than one step at a sitting. The note of instruc-
tions must enable him to carry out one step and write the next note.
Thus the state of progress of the computation at any stage is completely
determined by the note of instructions and the symbols on the tape.
That is, the state of the system may be described by a single expression
(sequence of symbols), consisting of the symbols on the tape followed
by A (which we suppose not to appear elsewhere) and then by the note
of instructions. This expression may be called the “state formula”. We
know that the state formula at any given stage is determined by the
state formula before the last step was made, and we assume that the
relation of these two formulae is expressible in the functional calculus.
In other words we assume that there is an axiom U which expresses the
rules governing the behavior of the computer, in terms of the relation
of the state formula at any stage to the state formula at the proceeding
stage. If this is so, we can construct a machine to write down the suc-
cessive state formulae, and hence to compute the required number. [44]
In so doing, the power of the machine is in no way altered. This is just a more prac-
tical way of doing what the machinery11 already did by using a note of instructions
instead of the “state of mind”.12
The Church-Turing thesis can be summarized in:
For every effectively calculable function exists a TM that calculates it.
The set of effectively calculable functions is identifiable with the set of
recursive functions.
11The mechanism by which the TM is composed, human beings calculating, in this case.
12Seems almost like the multitasking principle.
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The functions that are not calculable are the functions for which there exists no
TM that calculates them. An example of this kind of function is the Halt function.
According to Copeland:
A method, or procedure, M, for achieving some desired result is called
‘effective’ or ‘mechanical’ just in case
1. M is set out in terms of a finite number of exact instructions
(each instruction being expressed by means of a finite number of
symbols);
2. M will, if carried out without error, produce the desired result in
a finite number of steps;
3. M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by a human being
unaided by any machinery save paper and pencil;
4. M demands no insight or ingenuity on the part of the human being
carrying it out. [12]
And it seems like Turing thought so too, judging from what he says in [46]:
A man provided with paper, pencil, and rubber, and subject to strict
discipline, is in effect a universal machine.
It’s important to notice that this thesis is universally accepted but can not be
effectively demonstrated.
The interested reader is adviced to read [12], [41], [44], [6] and [43] for more
information regarding the topic.
1.3 Some models of Turing Machines.
There are different models of TM’s, in addition to the model presented by Turing
himself. The purpose of this section is to make a brief introduction to some of
these models. The power of the models presented in this section has been proven
to be the same of the classical TM. Some other models will be mentioned later in
the chapter regarding hypercomputation.
1. Multitape TM.
The Multitape TM is a TM with multiple tapes (as the name implies). As
such, it differs from the classical TM by its transition function. The transition
function for a TM with n tapes becomes:
δ : S × An → S × An × {l, n, r}
2. TMs with a bidimensional tape.
The TM with a bidimensional tape is a classical TM which has a tape which
has infinite rows and infinite columns. The scanning head can move also up
or down, this means that the transition function of these machines is:
δ : S × A→ S × A× {l, n, r, u, d}
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This type of TM allows an easy simulation of Multitape TMs and graphical
elaborations. Further variants allow the use of 3D tapes.
3. Nondeterministic TM.
The Nondeterministic TM is a TM that can have multiple transitions for
each combination of state of mind and input. Based on this model, the
Probabilistic TM model has been proposed.
4. Simplified TM.
The Simplified TM is a TM simplified in one of the following three aspects:
(a) The tape.
(b) The alphabet.
(c) The states of mind.
A TM can have an unlimited tape only by one side without losing any of its
calculating power.
A TM can have an alphabet made by only two symbols without losing any
of its calculating power.
A TM can have a set of states of mind made by only two states without
losing any of its calculating power.
Note that each of the above simplifications can not be made at the same time
with another simplification of the above.
There are also several other models of TMs which are of interest, like:
1. Oracle Machines.
2. Infinite Time TMs.
3. Trial-And-Error Machines (TAE).
a brief description of which will be given in the chapter regarding hypercomputa-
tion.
1.4 Phisical interpretation of the TM steps.
The TM is, basically, an idealistic machine. It serves as a calculation model but it
can not be built.13 In the description of the TM, two limitations are not considered:
• Time: there is no upper bound to the computation time needed by a TM
(even though the time at our disposal is limited).
• Space: the tape of the TM is considered to be infinite/unbounded.
13At least, not as it is described by Turing.
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The number of steps executable by a TM is considered, as with time, to be
finite even though it is seen as unbuonded. Regarding space, if we consider as true
the results of the WMAP project of NASA, the observable universe is finite, even
though it can grow limitlessly. During the computation of a TM one can create
the illusion of an infinite tape just by adding more tape when it is needed, but the
quantity of the tape available will always be finite. This is possible for the mere
reason that the tape needed for the completion of the computation (assuming that
the computation will end at some point) will always be a finite quantity.
If we want to consider time as a limited quantity (we put an upper limit to the
computation time), automatically we put a limit to the number of steps a TM can
execute. In this case we are interested in executing the greatest possible number
of steps in a time unit. To do so one can operate in two ways:
• Try to use the minimal number of steps by using already existing or by
creating new asymptotically optimal algorithms,
• Increase the number of steps executable in a single time unit.
By choosing the second way one must understand that to achieve the desired
result means to increase the speed of computation. As we can perceive by intuition,
such speed can not be increased as much as one might desire because of physical
reasons. But what are these reasons exactly?
A natural limit regarding speed, as the theory of relativity tells us, is the speed
of light. As a matter of fact, as such theory tells us, c = 299.792.458 m/s (in
vacuum conditions) is the maximum speed information and matter can travel with
in the universe. Obviously, while it is passing any material the speed of light is
smaller than the previously indicated quantity.14 The existence of the limit of the
speed of light (a finite quantity) puts a limit to the maximum speed with which
a computer can operate. Information, as a matter of fact, must travel between
physical parts (circuits in today’s computers). This claim is verified by the theory
of relativity itself. In fact, the energy E of an object with mass m > 0 and speed
v is given by the formula:
E = γmc2
where γ is Lorentz’s coefficient and has a value of:
γ =
(
1− v
2
c2
) 1
2
As one can verify from the given formula, γ = 1 for v = 0 (giving life to the famous
formula E = mc2) and tends to infinity for v that tends to c. This means that
to make objects with positive mass travel at the speed of light one must use an
infinite quantity of energy.
The speed of light is the upper limit for the speeds of objects with
positive rest mass. [18]
14Such quantity depends on the refractive index of the material itself.
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This however is not all there is to say on the subject. As we all know, in the TM
we also have interactions between physical parts. These interactions have also some
thermodynamic effects. As Mundici explains in [31]15, the power consumption of
a TM T grows not less than the square of its frequency, or rather:
f 2 ≤ 2piW
h
where
• f is the frequency of T (the number of steps executed in a time unit)
• W is the power used by T , measured in watt (power = energy per second)
• h is Planck’s constant
By the Heisenberg inequality, we have that the energy uncertainty must be:
∆E ≥ h (2pi∆t)−1
where:
• ∆E is the energy uncertainty
• ∆t is the time needed for the execution of a single step.
The energy used for the step must be greater than ∆E.
In their work, Mundici and Sieg conclude that the required volume (V ) to
contain z symbols must be:
V ≥ 4
3
zpia3m3
where:
• a is the hydrogen’s radius.
From this result we can deduce that the distance d from two symbols must be:
d = 2r ≥ 2az1
3
Considering the speed with which the signals can travel (less than the speed of
light) we have that the frequency f is:
f ≤ c
(
2az
1
3
)−1
steps per second
from which we have:
fz
1
3
≤
(
a
c
)−1
2
=
(
1
2
)
× 5.655× 1018 (1.1)
15See also [32].
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From (1.1) we can deduce that the maximum frequency of a machine is a
finite quantity and it decreases while the number of symbols used by the machine
increases.
We have now found some physical limits (mechanical ones) imposed on the
machine. We have that the speed of signal propagation and the speed with which
the mechanical parts of the machine can move have an upper bound, the speed of
light c = 299.792.458 m/s. We also have that the energy consumption for a single
step of the computation is lower bounded, the frequency of the machine is upper
bounded and the volume in which a symbol can be contained is lower bounded.
Now that we know these limits we can proceed and talk about hypercomputa-
tion.
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Chapter 2
Hypercomputation.
In this section i will try to make a brief introduction to the notion of hyper-
computation, continuing with a very brief description of the TM seen from the
hypercomputation’s point-of-view and then with a presentation of some models of
hypercomputers. While introducing these models, an effort will be made analyzing
the practical realizability of machines based on these models and then the section
will come to an end with the introduction of some critics made to the notion of
hypercomputability itself.
2.1 An introduction to Hypercomputation.
Hypercomputation is a relatively new branch of calculability. It rises from the idea
that the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT from now on) may not be true. The CTT
specifies that for each effectively computable function exists a TM that computes
it. The problem is that one can not demonstrate the truthfullness of the CTT.
In 1960 Scarpellini wrote, in a paper published by a german magazine in 1963,
that the existence of non recursive precesses (processes which are not computable
by a TM) may be possible in nature. He wrote:
One may ask whether it is possible to construct an analogue-computer
which is in a position to generate functions f(x) for which the predicate∫
f(x) cosnxdx > 0 is not decidable [by Turing machine] while the
machine itself decides by direct measurement whether
∫
f(x) cosnxdx
is greater than zero or not.
Scarpellini made it clear that:
Such a machine is naturally only of theoretical interest, since faultless
measuring is assumed, which requires the (absolute) validity of clas-
sical electrodynamics and probably such technical possibilities as the
existence of infinitely thin perfectly conducting wires. All the same,
the (theoretical) construction of such a machine would illustrate the
possibility of non-recursive natural processes.
and then he proceeded with a consideration regarding the brain and hypercompu-
tation:
15
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It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the brain may rely
on analogue processes for certain types of computation and decision-
making. Possible candidates which may give rise to such processes are
the axons of nerve cells.
. . .
It is conceivable that the mathematics of a collection of axons may lead
to undecidable propositions like those discussed in my paper.
Hypercomputers compute functions which are not computable by TMs. This
statement implies the fact that a hypercomputer may be able to compute the
halting function of a TM. This statement may seem to clash against the Turing’s
demonstration of the non-computability of such function but, as we will see, this is
not the case. Turing’s demonstration is quite interesting because it is applicable to
entire classes of machines. Basically, a TM can not compute the halting function of
any machine which is equivalent to a TM, but this does not imply that a machine
which is not equivalent to a TM - of a different class from that of a TM - can
not compute the halting function of a TM. There is no logical contradiction in a
machine of a certain class computing the halting function of a machine belonging
to a different class. A hypercomputer can not compute the halting function for
machines belonging to its own class.1
The first model of a hypercomputer is considered the machine introduced by
Turing in his paper [45], the Oracle Machine. This machine will be seen later in
this work. After this machine there have been introduced several other models of
hypercomputers.
Some hypercomputers are able to compute the so-called Supertasks.2 There are
- as one might guess - several models of hypercomputers and in this work i will try
to introduce and analize some of them and point out some of their limits.
It is important to clarify why the models of hypercomputers introduced in this
work are more powerful than a TM. Saying it simply, a hypercomputer is similar
to a TM with less limitations. If we notice, the limitations imposed on the original
model of a TM - where the computer is a human being which computes - are:
• The computer does not use any form of intellect.
• The computer can use only a pen and paper.
• The computer follows a set of determined rules during the computation.
• The computer has the data regarding the computation available to him writ-
ten in some determined form in the paper.
• The computer has the input data available before the computation starts.
• The computer can not accept any input data after the computation has
started.
1The demonstration of this statement has been given by T. Ord and T. D. Kieu in [34]
2With the term Supertask is indicated a task made by a numerable infinity of operations which
are completed in a finite amount of time.
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• If the computation has a result then it is unambiguous and it is obtained in
a finite amount of time.
The simulation of a human being subject to the before-mentioned limitations -
and of course the limitations given by the laws of physics - by a mechanical machine
is what we know as a computer. If we loose some limitations we can build a model
of a hypercomputer. Each model of hypercomputation introduced in this work is
basically a TM with less limitations (except one case).
2.2 The TM seen from Hypercomputation.
As it was pointed out before, a TM is just a calculating machine made by an infi-
nite tape, a device to read from and write into the tape, a finite set of symbols - its
alphabet - and a finite set of states of mind. The CTT says that this machine com-
putes all the naturally computable functions, these functions being the functions
computable by a human being endowed with a pen and paper, precise computing
rules and not allowed to use its characteristic intelligence. This machine executes
a finite set of operations:
1. Move the read/write device to the left or to the right.
2. Read from a cell of the tape.
3. Write to a cell of the tape.
4. Change the state of mind of the machine.
About the way these operations are executed Turing, in [44], does not say
anything.3 These operations are made available by some black boxes.4 In the
year 1939 Turing publishes a paper in which another machine is described, what
would have been later known as the first hypercomputer, the Oracle-machine (O-
machine).
2.3 Some models of Hypercomputers.
There exist several models of hypercomputational machines. The purpose of this
section is not to make an exhaustive list of these models but to introduce the most
relevant models and to analyze the main aspects regarding the realization of these
machines, if possible. It must be clear that the last word regarding the realization
of these machines is to be said by physics. Some of these models, according to
modern physics, can not be built because they need some resources which are
not available. Some of these models require an effectively infinite tape (it is not
3Are they the result of the computation of a number or are they something else?
4The composition and the functioning of these boxes is not necessary for the description of
the machine itself.
18 CHAPTER 2. HYPERCOMPUTATION.
enough to have an illimited tape), some models require faultless measuring and for
other models is required to work in a different time-space (more details will come
afterwards). It seems though that there has been built a machine which is based on
a hypercomputational model and this model will be discussed in the third chapter.
2.3.1 O-machine.
The O-machines have been introduced by Turing in his paper [45]. The O-machines
are TMs equiped with a black box capable of solving problems which are not
solvable by a classical TM. These black boxes are, basically, machines that can
hypercompute. This is how Turing introduced the O-machines:
Let us suppose that we are supplied with some unspecified means of
solving number-theoretic problems; a kind of oracle as it were. We
shall not go any further into the nature of this oracle apart from saying
that it cannot be a machine. With the help of the oracle we could
form a new kind of machine (call them o-machines), having as one
of its fundamental processes that of solving a given number-theoretic
problem.
With the term "number-theoretic problem" are indicated the problems which
can be formulated in arithmetical terms. We can suppose that, with this term,
Turing meant to indicate problems similar to what he introduced in the 1936, to
tell, given a TM, if it prints a finite quantity of binary digits or not.5
Turing’s introduction of the O-machines is, from a certain point of view, a little
bit confusing. In it, Turing specifies that the oracle can not be a machine and,
on the other hand, he describes them as "means" and talks about the O-machines
as "a new kind of machine". Truth is, it may be difficult to consider the basic
components of machines as machines themselves,6 but it is also difficult finding a
"means" which is not a machine of some kind which is able to compute what is
not computable by a TM. Maybe Turing meant that is could not be a TM, but the
fact is that the oracle must be something that computes functions which are not
computable by a TM, to say it otherwise: the oracle must compute more functions
than a TM.
2.3.2 TAE machine.
The idea behind Trial-And-Error (TAE) machines was introduced in the 1965 by
H. Putnam and M. Gold in their separate works [36] and [19]. Basically, TAE
machines are, as mentioned previously, TMs with less limitations, or more freedom
if we want. This is easily understood by Putnam’s introduction:
What happens if we modify the notion of a decision procedure by:
5If this was not the case then there would be no need for the existence of the Oracle because
the problem would be solvable with a simple TM.
6We do not consider a tape, in the case of a TM, as a machine.
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1. Allowing the procedure to "change its mind" any finite number of
times (in terms of Turing Machines: we visualize the machine as
being given an integer (or an n-tuple of integers) as input. The
machine then "prints out" a finite sequence of "yesses" and "nos".
The last "yes" or "no" is always to be the correct answer.); and
2. We give up the requirement that it be possible to tell (effectively)
if the computation has terminated?
I.e., if the machine has most recently printed "yes", then we know that
the integer put in as input must be in the set unless the machine is
going to change its mind; but we have no procedure for telling whether
the machine will change its mind or not. . . .
If we always "posit" that the most recently generated answer is correct,
we will make a finite number of mistakes, but we will eventually get
the correct answer. (Note, however, that even if we have gotten to the
correct answer (the end of the finite sequence) we are never sure that
we have the correct answer.)
Peter Kugel, as suggested in his article [29], says that the human mind is a
TAE machine (at least some parts of it). In fact, the way we think and act is
sometimes similar to the way a TAE machine works, even though my personal
opinion is not completely compatible with Kugel’s in this case. The human mind
also exhibits some characteristics of other models of hypercomputation later de-
scribed in this work, like the Coupled Turing Machine (CTM) and the Accelerated
Turing Machine. I agree with the fact that single events may be treated like a TAE
machine does a single computation but let’s recall the way these machines work.
TAE machines receive the input data and compute the received input without ac-
cepting other input as the mind - and the CTM - does. Also, it seams that the
"computations" - if we want to call them like this - executed by the mind are done
faster each time one of them is repeated, which is a characteristic of ATMs.7 In
the section regarding the CTMs I will describe my opinion in more detail so that it
can be more easily understandable. For more information regarding Kugel’s model
the reader should consult Kugel’s work: [29].
To better understand the way TAE machines work one should be familiar with
the concept of Trial-And-Error procedure. The Trial-And-Error is an experimental
method used for problem solving, repairing and knowledge acquisition. Like the
name itself suggests, it is expected to try one possible solution after another until
the problem is solved, keeping trace of the mistakes made previously.
This kind of approach is used for the resolution of simple problems or when
none of the other approaches works. This does not mean that this approach is a
brute force approach, on the contrary, most of the times there is a certain logic
behind each step, until the reach of a successful result. Usually this method is put
to use when one has little experience - or no experience at all - in the field the
problem belongs to.
7Even though, as we will later see, the acceleration expected in this model is by far superior
to the acceleration observed in the mind’s computation.
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As described in [22], it seems that some spiders use Trial-And-Error tactics to
hunt for preys they have never seen before or when they are in unusual situations
and they seem to remember the new tactics they have applied.
The Bogosort, an extremely inefficient sorting algorithm, can be seen as a kind
of Trial-And-Error algorithm, even though the original version of it does not keep
trace of the already used combinations, violating in this way one of the principles
of the Trial-And-Error procedures. The pseudo-code of this algorithm is:
while(not_sorted(array[])){
scramble_elements(array[]);
}
An effectively Trial-And-Error version of this algorithm, one that would keep
trace of the already used combinations, would be more efficient than the original
version. Such version would - in fact - guarantee that the procedure would end in
a finite amount of time, something that the original version does not guarantee.
The Trial-And-Error is a method sometimes used to find new medicines. Some-
times two or more drugs are combined until a desired effect is obtained.
A simple application of this method was given in [4] (section 11/5).
Suppose N events each have a probability p of success, and the prob-
abilities are independent. An example would occur if N wheels bore
letters A and B on the rim, with A’s occupying the fraction p of the cir-
cumference and B’s the remainder. All are spun and allowed to come
to rest; those that stop at an A count as successes. Let us compare
three ways of compounding these minor successes to a Grand Success,
which, we assume, occurs only when every wheel is stopped at an A.
Case 1 : All N wheels are spun; if all show an A, Success is recorded
and the trials ended; otherwise all are spun again, and so on till ’ all
A’s ’ comes up at one spin.
Case 2 : The first wheel is spun; if it stops at an A it is left there;
otherwise it is spun again. When it eventually stops at an A the second
wheel is spun similarly; and so on down the line of N wheels, one at a
time, till all show A’s.
Case 3 : AllN wheels are spun; those that show an A are left to continue
showing it, and those that show a B are spun again. When further A’s
occur they also are left alone. So the number spun gets fewer and fewer,
until all are at A’s.
. . .
. . . Suppose, for instance, that p is 1
2
, that spins occur at one a second,
and that N is 1000. Then if T1, T2 and T3 are the average times to
reach Success in Cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively,
T1 = 2
1000 seconds,
T2 =
1000
2
seconds,
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T3 = rather more than
1
2
second.
Notice that no kind of intelligence is used in the described decision procedures.
All 3 procedures are purely mechanical.
Ashby, noticing the different solutions based on a Trial-And-Error strategy,
suggested the existence of meta-levels of Trial-And-Error, a kind of TAE hierarchy
if we can say so. This idea is extended to the point of having a recursive sequence
of meta-levels. Based on these consideration, Ashby comes to the conclusion that
human intelligence is based on TAE trials. In other words, Ashby suggests that
there is are some primitive TAE trials upon which a certain number of meta-levels
are built until we have what we now know as Intelligence. One comes to the
conclusion that Intelligence is nothing more than a set of TAE trials.
Regarding TAE machines, we can say that these machines are able to execute
decision procedures applied to recursively enumerable sets. As we know, these
decision procedures, generally, can not be executed by a TM until we violate at
least one of the conditions introduced in the section 2.1.
As we know, recursively enumerable sets are supersets of the recursive sets.
In other words, the recursively enumerable sets are the sets that have a partially
recursive characteristic function, one of the following kind:
f(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
indefinite otherwise
The reader interested in more detailed informations regarding recursively enu-
merable sets can read [5] and [8].
In his work, Putnam defines also the concept of Trial-And-Error predicate:
P is a trial and error predicate if and only if there is a g.r. (general
recursive) function f such that (for every x1, x2, . . . , xn)
P (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≡ lim
y→∞
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y) = 1
P¯ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≡ lim
y→∞
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y) = 0
where
lim
y→∞
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y) = k
def
= ∃y∀z(z ≥ y ⇒ f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, z) = k)
Putnam introduced also the concept of a k-trial predicate in the following way:
Call a predicate P a k-trial predicate if there is a g.r. function f and a
fixed integer k such that (for all x1, x2, . . . , xn)
P (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≡ lim
y→∞
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y) = 1
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Based on Putnam’s results, one can say that a predicate is a Trial-And-Error
one if and only if a recursive function which gives a result, in a finite number of
steps, which will not change anymore, exists.
In the same paper, Putnam gave proof of the following theorem:
Theorem: P is a Trial-And-Error predicate if and only if:
P ∈ Π2 ∩ Σ2
Notice that the functions computable by a TM are the recursive ones (∆1). A
TAE predicate is an application of the limit to a ∆1 predicate, in other words, a
∆2 predicate.
A Σ0n predicate is a predicate which has the following form:
∃n1 . . . ∃nkψ where ψ is a Π0n−1 predicate.
A Π0n predicate is a predicate which has the following form:
∀n1 . . . ∀nkψ where ψ is a Σ0n−1 predicate.
A Σ01 predicate is a predicate which has the following form:
∃n1 . . . ∃nkψ
where ψ contains quantifiers of the form:
∀n < t and ∃n < t
The sets:
A ∈ Σ01
are the recursively enumerable sets. An example of such set is:
A = {x|∃i ∈ N, ϕx(i) ends in less than i steps}
The negation of a Σ01 predicate is a Π01 predicate. Proceeding with the previous
example, we have:
A¯ = {x| 6 ∃i ∈ N, ϕx(i) ends in less than i steps}
A¯ = {x|∀i, ϕx(i) does not end in less than i steps}
A ∆0n predicate is both a Σ0n and a Π0n predicate, more precisely:
∆0n = Σ
0
n ∩ Π0n
The sets T for which exists a TM that calculates the function:
f(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ T
0 otherwise
(2.1)
are ∆01 sets.
The set of numbers computable by a TAE machine, as one can easily see from
the previously given data, is from a superior level in the arithmetic hierachy than
the set of numbers computable by a TM.
These machines can be used to calculate the halting problem - as described by
Kugel - and other equivalent problems such as the verification of the Goldbach’s
conjecture. The Goldbach’s conjecture can be expressed in the following way:
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Every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two
prime integers.
To solve this problem a TAE machine could:
1. The machine prints "yes" as a first answer.8
2. The machine analizes the next even integer.
3. If the analized number can be written as the summ of two prime integers the
machine continues from step 2, otherwise the machine "changes its mind"
and prints "no" as the next answer and eventually terminates its computa-
tion.
Other authors have introduced other hypercomputational machines similar to
the TAE machines.9
2.3.3 Accelerated Turing Machine.
The Accelerated Turing Machines (ATM from now on) have been inspired by the
Zeno’s paradox. To describe this paradox let’s give the classic example of the race
between Achilles and the tortoise.
If the tortoise and Achilles must reach a certain place B starting from a point
A and the tortoise starts with an advantage of some meters, Achilles will not be
able to reach the finish before the tortoise. To reach the finishing line before the
tortoise Achilles must first reach the tortoise but in the meantime the tortoise has
advanced in further away point. To surpass the tortoise, Achilles must reach the
actual position of the tortoise but then, again, the tortoise in the meantime has
reached a further away point. Going on with this kind of reasoning one can easily
conclude that Achilles will never reach the tortoise as he must reach the tortoise’s
location an infiniti of times. The paradox can be better explained using a simple
picture:
The idea of accomplishing an infinite amount of actions10 in a finite amount of
time is represented with the word supertask. This word must not be confused with
8The first even integer greater than 2 is 4 which can be written as 4 = 2 + 2.
9Jaakko Hintikka and Arto Mutanen in [23](chapter 9) introduced a machine very similar
to a TAE machine. Mark Burgin, in [9], introduces the Inductive Turing Machines. For more
information regarding these machine consult [23] and [9].
10A numerable infinity.
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the word Hyper-task which represents the idea of accomplishing a non numerable
infinity of actions in a finite amount of time. According to some philosophers,
supertasks are logically impossible. The reason for this will be more clear after the
introduction of the ATMs.
The ATMs are TMs that execute the first step of the calculation in 20 = 1 unit
of time, the second step in 2−1 units of time, the third step in 2−2 units of time,
the fourth step in 2−3 units of time and so on. The time t needed for the execution
of n steps of a computation is given by the (well known) formula:
t =
n∑
i=0
2−i
It is easy to verify that:
lim
n→∞
t = 2
This result says that this machine can execute an infinite amount of steps in 2
units of time.
Now, let’s make the machine compute the function x = x+ 1 for n times where
the initial value of x is 0 and n→∞. The first time this operation will be executed
in 1 minute.11 The second time the operation will be executed in half a minute,
2−1 = 1
2
. The third time it will be executed in a quarter of a minute, 2−2 = 1
4
, and
so on. The n-th time the operation will be executed in 2−(n−1) minutes. At the
end of the second minute (the end of the execution), will x be an even number or
an odd one?
The main philosophical problem of the ATMs, but we can say that it is a
problem which regards supertasks, is the fact that one knows the initial state
of the machine - or state of the world, if we may say so - in the beginning of the
computation but the final state is unknown. We’ll go more in depth of this problem
later when we’ll discuss the power of these machines.
From a certain point of view, ATMs work as human beings - the more we do
something the faster we become at doing it even though, at some point in time,
one won’t be able to become faster than what he already is.
I find it quite interesting to analyze these machines in two respects:
1. Physical realizability.
2. Computational power.
From Physics we know that these machines are unrealizable. In section 1.4 are
described some physical limitations naturally imposed to each calculation step. As
one may notice, these limitations are easily reachable by ATMs, even if one is willing
to wait for a relatively long time. The difference between the number of calculation
steps executed by this machine in 1 minute and the number of calculation steps
executed in 64 minutes is just 6. The difference between the number of calculation
steps executed in 1 second and the number of calculation steps executed in 21000
seconds - a waiting time greater than the estimated age of the universe - is just
1000. Assuming that the I/O head of the machine moves at a speed of 1m
s
for the
11We are taking a minute as the time unit.
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first calculation step we would have that the speed necessary for the execution of
the 29-th calculation step would be greater than the speed of light, a rather low
number of steps. Keeping in mind these considerations one can think of reducing
the distance between the squares of the tape when the speed can not be further
increased. Even in this case though we would have that after a few steps the
distance would not be further reducible.
Let’s suppose that we can overcome the limit of the speed of light.12 In this
case another problem arises: space. A function may need a finite - arbitrarily large
- quantity of tape but, in the case of ATMs, it may also need an infinite quantity
of tape. Let’s consider the following programs, written in pseudo-code:
Program 1:
begin
i := 1;
while(i > 0) do i := i;
end
Program 2:
begin
i := 1;
while(i > 0) do i := i + 1;
end
For the first program we have that the necessary quantity of tape for its com-
putation is finite. This is not true for the second program. In fact, the second
program needs an infinite quantity of tape, a quantity which is not containable in
the observable universe.13
If we want an ATM with a finite quantity of tape - even if it may be arbitrarily
large - we must give up on the idea of having it compute more than the classical
TM. In [10], Calude and Staiger give proof that every TM that uses a finite quantity
of tape - even if it operates as an ATM - can not compute a function which is not
computable by a classical TM.
Let’s talk now about the computational power of ATMs (without taking into
account the problem of their physical realizability). As said previously, an ATM
is able to execute supertasks and that brings forth some logical problems related
to them. One of the most known is the problem of Thomson’s lamp. The problem
introduced by Thomson14 was to specify the state of a lamp that switched states
12Putz and Svozil have introduced in [37] the theoretical possibility of "pushing" a machine
to compute with a greater speed than the speed of light by immersing it in a substance with a
refractive index lower than one. As the authors say:
. . . at present such a possibility merely remains a theoretical speculation
13Some considerations on this topic are given in the section 1.4 of the present thesis.
14The British philosopher who introduced the term supertask.
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- on/off - in a time-pattern similar to the execution of the computation steps in
ATMs in the end of 2 time units. The problem seems to be in the fact that if
the lamp is off at the end of the second time-unit it will switch to on right after
and vice versa. Benacerraf - in [7] - noticed that this argument is invalid. In fact,
we can see the operation of such a mechanism as a function specified in the range
[0, 2). This function is not specified out of this range, that is the range [2,∞). The
function may or may not be continuous for the value 2.[39]
There is another considerable problem with supertasks, its existence. Is there
any way of executing a supertask? Theoretically it is possible to execute supertasks.
As we will see later in this thesis, in this universe seems like there exist space-time
structures that allow the execution of supertasks.
In [39] the author argues about another topic: By making a machine able to
execute supertasks does its computational power really increase?
Unlike the “ordinary” Turing machines, accelerating Turing machines
can complete infinitely many steps within a finite span of time. But do
they have more computational power? Do they solve, for example, the
halting problem? I argue that they do not. [39]
In case the author, with the term halting problem, intends halting problem for
a classical TM, I must disagree with what is said above. In [34], as said before,
is demonstrated that a machine is unable to solve its own halting problem or the
halting problem of machines belonging to its class, but this does not prevent them
from solving the halting problem of machines belonging to a different class. A way
in which an ATM can solve the halting problem of a TM is described in T. Ord’s
work [33]:
Consider an accelerated Turing machine, A, that was programmed to
simulate an arbitrary Turing machine on arbitrary input. If the Turing
machine halts on its input, A then changes the value of a specified
square on its tape (say the first square) from a 0 to a 1. If the Turing
machine does not halt, then A leaves the special square as 0. Either
way, after 2 time units, the first square on A’s tape holds the value of
the halting function for this Turing machine and its input.
The problem, according to Shagrir, lies in the fact that an ATM does not have
a state to indicate the end of the computation, as is the case with the Infinite Time
Turing Machine. A simple version of this machine can be seen as an ATM which,
at the end of the second unit of time enters a special state and then continues its
work with the output of the previous 2 time-units computation as input for the
next 2 time-units computation. According to Shagrir, a machine that has the same
structure of a TM can compute the same functions of a TM even if it is able to
execute supertasks.
I do not deny that this infinite time Turing machine computes the
halting function. I also do not mind the name infinite time Turing ma-
chine. Rather, my point is this. If accelerating Turing machines have
exactly the same computational structure as ordinary Turing machines,
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then they compute exactly the Turing machine computable functions.
Performing supertasks enables the accelerating machines to complete
infinitely many steps in a finite interval of time, but it does not enable
to compute functions that the ordinary machines cannot compute. And
if accelerating Turing machines differ from ordinary Turing machines
in computational structure, as is the case with infinite time Turing
machines, then they might have more computational power. But here
too, the difference in computational power is not due to performing
supertasks alone. Performing a supertask only ensures that the com-
putation terminates in a finite real time, even if it requires infinitely
many computation steps. The difference in computational power owes
to the difference in computational end structure. Either way, no para-
dox emerges. If the accelerating Turing machine has the same com-
putational structure as the ordinary machine, it does not compute the
halting function. And if we extend the concept of the Turing machine,
redefining the end structure, it should come as no surprise that the
newly specified Turing machines compute functions, e.g., the halting
function, that Turing’s machines – the machines that Turing specified
– fail to compute. [39]
I find that making machines able to enter a special state at the end of a fixed
period of time means making them “conscious” about time or about the steps
executed up until that moment.
Regarding the computational power of Infinite Time Turing Machines we have
that:
There are no logical contradictions in the infinite time Turing machine
metaphor and they have given rise to an interesting theory in which, for
example, P 6= NP and Π11 sets are decidable by these devices. However,
there is no suggestion at all of how such devices might be engineered or
even conceived in a physical theory (nor is it necessary if these devices
are considered in a logic context only) so these are “machines” in name
only. [35]
ATMs are able to decide predicates P such that: P ∈ Π01 or P ∈ Σ01. These
machines are able to compute the characteristic functions of the recursively enu-
merable sets.
2.3.4 Real Computer.
A Real Computer (RC from now on) is a computer which process real numbers
- x ∈ R - with infinite precision. This machine can be seen as an ideal analog
computer. As one might guess, for the physical realization of this machine, means
that let you work with numbers with infinite precision are needed.15
There have been some proposals of considering the number of particles in the
observable universe - a number estimated to be between 1079 and 1081 - as infinite.
15Physics tells us that these means can not be built.
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According to these proposals the number of decimal digits of a real number must
have this length at most. We know that if we consider these proposals as reason-
able we must consider the set of real numbers as a finite set, making it perfectly
numerable. It would be such even if we consider it as an infinite set but made only
with numbers which length would be arbitrary - even greater than 1081 - but finite.
Such a number can very well be represented by a function which uses two natural
numbers as parameters:
real(a, b) = a× 10−b where a, b ∈ N
Having such a function and considering the set of real numbers as an infinite set
made only with numbers which length is arbitrary but finite would allow us to use
the method used to counted fractions or, in general, each couple of natural numbers.
Assuming that we have pairs of natural numbers that are supposed to represent
real numbers in a matrix like the matrix used by Cantor to demonstrate the non-
countability of real numbers, numbering its diagonals in the opposite direction
of what is used for the demonstration of the non-countability of real numbers
and assigning the number 0 to the first pair, we would need only 3 functions to
enumerate the set of real numbers made as said before. These functions would be:
1. A function to estimate the number of the first couple in a diagonal x:
f(x) =
x(x+ 1)
2
for x ∈ N
2. A function to estimate the number that must be given to a couple of natural
numbers (x, y):
g(x, y) =

0 se x = 0
g( x
10
, y − 1) se x mod 10 = 0
f(x+ y) + y altrimenti
3. A function that estimates the values of the elements of a couple with a given
representation number:
h(x) =

⌊√
1+8x−1
2
⌋ ⌊
5+
√
1+8x
2
⌋
2
− x, x−
⌊√
1+8x−1
2
⌋ ⌊
1+
√
1+8x
2
⌋
2

Assuming that we have the necessary means to measure a real number with
arbitrary precision we would have all the necessary tools to manipulate the set of
real numbers. Modern Physics tells us that these means are only ideal ones being
that from a certain point onwards we would have some insurmountable physical
problems with the measurements. The problem with the countability of the set of
real numbers is the infinitely small numbers, those numbers that are represented by
an infinite amount of decimal numbers and which are not periodic. If we limit the
set of real numbers to those numbers that are not infinitely small we actually take
out of the set those numbers that make it non-countable, but would it actually be
useful to computability? I do not think so, after all, we are already able to count
this set.
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2.3.5 Coupled Turing Machines.
As we know, a TM does not accept any input once its computation has started.
The idea behind the Coupled Turing Machines (CTM from now on) is to have a
TM that accepts input which may come even after the start of the computation.
Theoretically, not all CTMs can be simulated by TMs. In the case of the com-
putation of a real number, a CTM can operate on a digit of the number while it
is receiving the next digit in input. This operation can not be executed by a TM
because in this case the digits of the real number must first be generated - all of
them - and then given as input to the TM so that it can operate on them.
As I personally see it, the CTM is like an O-machine where the environment
with which the machine is connected plays the role of the oracle. The only feature
that makes it different from an O-machine is the fact that the CTM’s input can
be a data stream.
As I mentioned earlier, the way this machine works is similar to the way our
mind works. It is my intention to make a brief introduction to Kugel’s model of
the mind and to explain the reasons why I do not agree totally with this model.
According to Kugel, the mind is made of 4 modules:
• Input Processor - the module that gathers data from the surrounding envi-
ronment and transforms them in data that are accessible and modifiable by
the Central Processor. For example, it can receive a visual signal from the
retina and transform it in the message “A tiger is near ” and send it to the
Central Processor for further processing.
• Central Processor - the module that receives the input data from the Input
Processor and transforms it in a message that will be given as input to the
Output Processor. For example, the message “A tiger is near ” could be
transformed in the message “Run”.
• Program Selector - the module that selects the program that has to be exe-
cuted at a certain moment. For example, when a tiger is seen this module
may choose to execute the ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION program rather
than the APPRECIATION OF THE BEAUTY program.
• Output Processor - the module that receives as input the message sent by the
Central Processor and transforms it into messages that can change the sur-
rounding environment. For example, it can take the message “Run” as input
and transform it in messages that make it possible to control the different
muscles that are necessary to actually run.
Although I fairly agree with the logical division in the 4 modules listed above,
I disagree with the fact that these modules are TAE machines. I would rather see
them as CTMs. These modules are always working and accept input even when
they are already computing, which is a characteristic of CTMs. I partially disagree
with the data flow given in [29] (page 5) also.
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In my opinion, the data flow given above is incomplete and should be like the
following:
The Input Processor gathers data from the surrounding environment and trans-
forms them in data that are accessible and modifiable byte the Central Processor
and Program Selector. The Central Processor receives the data from the Input
Processor and Program Selector and then processes them and afterwards they are
sent to the Output Processor. These modules - except for the Input Processor -
can be seen also as TAE machines that accept input even while they are computing
(a sort of Coupled TAE machine). The Input Processor’s can be seen as a simple
CTM as its job is to receive data continuously and make them accessible to other
modules.
2.3.6 Malament-Hogarth Machine.
This model was created once it was observed that is not always necessary for a
computer - a TM - to be under observation, the observer does not have the duty
to continually keep an eye on the TM while it is computing. Theoretically it is
possible to send a TM in a different space-time from the one the observer is in, in
a space-time where it can execute an infinite amount of computational steps while
for the observer has only passed a finite amount of time. One can put a signaling
device in the TM which will send a signal to the observer when the computation
has come to an end. In this way the TM can solve the halting problem: If the
signal is sent before a certain (finite) time limit, that computation ends, if not, it
does not end.
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I would say that for the production of this computing system there are a few
considerations to make:
1. Finding - or creating, if possible - the environments with the necessary space-
times.
2. Having the necessary means to move and comunicate from one space-time to
the other.
3. Having the means that let you work safely.
Quoting [15]:
The Kerr metric, which describes empty space-time around a rotating
black hole, possesses these features: a computer can orbit the black hole
indefinitely, while an observer falling into the black hole experiences
an M-H event as they cross the inner event horizon. (This, however,
neglects the effects of Black Hole Evaporation.)
The issue becomes more complicated if one considers the effects of Black Hole
Evaporation.
For more information regarding this model see [43] and [15].
2.4 Critics to the notion of Hypercomputation.
In his paper [11], Copeland answers to several critics made to the notion of hyper-
computation. The purpose of this section is to give a brief summary of some of
these critics and the answers given.
1. Any task that can be made completely precise can be programmed
for the universal Turing machine. In other words, given enough
memory and sufficient time, a standard digital computer can com-
pute any rule-governed input-output function. That is what Turing
and Church showed. Therefore the notion of hypercomputation is
otiose.
. . . Turing and Church are sometimes said to have shown that a
standard digital computer can, given enough memory and sufficient
time, compute any rule-governed input-output function. . . In fact,
they showed the opposite. There is nothing imprecise about the
halting problem. The halting function is certainly rulegoverned.
2. Turing showed in 1936 that every mechanical process can be carried
out by the universal Turing machine. Therefore ‘hypercomputers’
are not machines of any sort — let alone computing machines.
Turing, in 1936, showed that a TM can execute all the operations that a
human being could execute if he would be subject to the rules mentioned
in §1. He showed that the computable - mechanically, by a TM - numbers
are all the numbers that are computable by a human being subject to the
before-mentioned rules.
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This thesis carries no implication concerning the extent of what
can be calculated by a machine, for among the machine’s repertoire
of fundamental processes there may be those that a human rote-
worker unaided by machinery cannot perform.[11]
Personally, I agree only partially with the quote above. I think that the
power of a machine is directly linked to the conditions it is working in. I
do not think that - even though I am not totally sure about it - among the
processes that are executable from a machine there may be processes that
are not executable by a human being.
3. Hypercomputation seems to amount to the claim that there might
be mechanical processes that are not mechanical!
True—so long as ‘mechanical’ means something different at the two
occurrences. At the second occurrence, ‘mechanical’ has its tech-
nical sense: ‘not mechanical’ means ‘cannot be done by a human
computer’. At the earlier occurrence, ‘mechanical process’ means
simply ‘process that can be carried out by a machine’.
4. Over the years, a number of alternative analyses have been given of
the notion of a mechanical process. Apart from Turing’s analysis
in terms of Turing machines, and Church’s analyses in terms of
lambda-definability and recursiveness, there are analyses, e.g., in
terms of register machines, Post’s canonical and normal systems,
combinatory definability, Markov algorithms, and Gödel’s notion
of reckonability. The striking thing is that these various analyses
all turn out to be provably equivalent in extension. Because of the
prima facie diversity of the various analyses, their equivalence is
strong evidence that whatever can be done by a machine, mathe-
matically speaking, can be done by the universal Turing machine.
The analyses under question are all analyses of the notion of an effective
method. These analyses form a strong evidence that the Church-Turing
Thesis is true but they do not say what the power of a machine may be if it
operates under different conditions.16
5. It seems that according to hypercomputationalists, every function
is computable (or generatable by some machine). Each number-
theoretic function is computable by a machine accessing an infinite
tape on which are listed all the arguments of the function and the
corresponding values. ETMs (Section 1.6) even permit an entire
real number to be stored on a single square of the machine’s tape.
And there is no reason to stop there – additional fantasy brings ad-
ditional computable functions. On the new way of speaking, ‘com-
putable function’ means simply ‘function’. Hypercomputationalism
comes down to this: the term ‘computable’ is redundant.
16TAE machines are a perfect example. TAE machines are TM that operate under different
conditions and they can calculate more functions than a TM.
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Hypercomputationalists believe that statements concerning com-
putability are explicitly or implicitly indexed to a set of capacities
and resources. . .When classicists say that some functions are ab-
solutely uncomputable, what they mean is that some functions are
not computable relative to the capacities and resources of a stan-
dard Turing machine. That particular index is of paramount inter-
est when the topic is computation by effective procedures. In the
wider study of computability, other indices are of importance. As
the objection indicates, some indexed statements of computabil-
ity are entirely trivial — for example, the statement that each
number-theoretic function is computable relative to itself. This is
not generally so, however. Mathematical theorems of the form ‘f
is computable relative to r’ are often hard-won. Questions about
which functions are computable relative to certain physical theories
are seldom trivial. The question of which functions are computable
relative to the theories that characterise the real world is of out-
standing interest.
6. One suggestion made by hypercomputationalists is that some form
of quantum computer may be able to compute non Turing-machine-
computable functions. However, the originator of the universal
quantum computer, David Deutsch, states that this is not so. . .
A number of different quantum computational architectures have
been proposed. Some are not hypercomputational, some are. In a
paper in this collection, Kieu outlines a hypercomputational quan-
tum computer that is able to solve Hilbert’s tenth problem.
Despite what Deutsch says, his universal quantum computer is able
to compute non-recursive functions, since an entire non-recursive
function can be encoded into one of the real-valued parameters fig-
uring in the quantum-mechanical description of the machine (Solo-
vay, personal communication). . .
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Chapter 3
Quantistic Computation.
In the last part of the thesis we will talk about Quantum Computing and its con-
nection to Hypercomputation. We will start with a brief introduction to Quantum
Computing so that we can give some basic information to better understand what
will be introduced later, the Adiabatic Quantum Computing.
Notice that the purpose of this chapter is not to give an exhaustive explanation
of the concepts mentioned above; it is just to make a brief introduction to these
concepts and give the necessary information regarding the objective of this thesis.
For more information on these concepts one is advised to read [48], [20] and [40]
and the papers of Tien D. Kieu mentioned in the coming sections.
3.1 An introduction to Quantum Computing.
Lately, in the scientific world, quantum computing is becoming more well–known,
and for a good reason I would dare say. Gordon Moore – one of the co–founders
of Intel – noticed in 1965 that the number of transistors per surface unit in a
circuit was doubling every 18 months while the power increased. According to
Moore, this trend would continue in the future and – as we well know – so it was.
That affirmation became known as Moore’s Law. If this trend will continue then
fewer atoms will be used to implement more bits, until one atom will be used to
implement one bit. With the current trend this limit is estimated to be reached in
the year 2020.
At that point, classical physics will not be sufficient to describe and handle the
physical steps of a computation. At that point the use of Quantum Physics will be
necessary. The laws of quantum physics are very different from the laws of classical
physics. That which is normal for quantum physics is not normal at all for classical
physics. For example, a quantum may be in more than one place at a time, or in
more than one physical state at the same time. This behaviour is inconceivable
for an object in the domain of classical physics. A quantum bit can have a value
of 0 or 1 at the same time. Using quantum computing one can obtain a random
number while in classical computation one can only obtain a pseudo–random one.
The microscopic objects described by quantum mechanics behave sometimes like
particles and sometimes like waves.
The topics of most interest for us right now are: What can a Quantum Computer
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compute? Can a Quantum Computer compute more than a TM?
According to David Deutsch – the creator of the Universal Quantum Computer
– a Quantum Computer has the same computational power as a TM, it is faster
but its computational power is the same as a TM. In the same time in [14] he says
something that – from a certain point of view – is similar to a basic principle of
hypercomputation:
The theory of computation has traditionally been studied almost en-
tirely in the abstract, as a topic in pure mathematics. This is to miss
the point of it. Computers are physical objects, and computations are
physical processes. What computers can or cannot compute is deter-
mined by the laws of physics alone, and not by pure mathematics.
This quote can be perceived in two ways:
• From a hypercomputational point of view: One can create a new computer
model as long as it does not conflict with any laws of physics.
• From a classical point of view: It is useless to create a computational model
based on pure mathematics. A computer must be physically realizable.
As mentioned before, there are quite a variety of Qauntum Computer models.
In this chapter, after a brief introduction of some necessary concepts of quantum
mechanics and quantum computing, we will explore a model that has generated
some heated discussions in the scientific world: Tien D. Kieu’s Adiabatic Quantum
Computing. It is said that Kieu’s Adiabatic Quantum Computer is able to answer
Hilbert’s 10–th problem, a problem which no classical computer can give an answer
to. But first – in order to better understand the model – let’s start with the basis.
3.2 Qubit. What? Why? When?
As we know, at the very core of any modern digital equipment are the bits. In
order to make modern digital equipments work we must manipulate bits. A bit is
like an abstract data type; there are many ways to represent it. The most crucial
thing to have is a way of distinguishing between its two values: 0 and 1. Once
we can distinguish these values, store and manipulate them we can create all the
digital machines we need.
Today this is all given for granted: we can easily store, read and modify the
value of a bit.
Richard Feynman, in his paper [17], alluded to the possibility of a further
miniaturization of digital aparatuses and also anticipated that very small objects
would be manipulated by the laws of quantum mechanics rather than classical
mechanics. Given that the values of the bits must also be stored in some sort of
physical support and that these supports would become smaller and smaller, for the
explanation of their behaviour and for their manipulation quantum physics would
be necessary. At that point, what we now know about bits and their manipulation
will no longer be true.
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There are quite some substantial differences between the quantum bits – or,
Qubits – and the classical bits we know today. For example:
• A classical bit can be in only one of its two possible states – 0 or 1 – while
a qubit can be in a superposition of these states.
• A classical bit can be read or copied without altering its state or altering the
states of other bits while a qubit can not be read or copied without altering
its state and – in case it is entangled with other qubits – without altering the
states of the qubits it is entangled with.
Obviously, to use the qubit, one needs a way to manipulate them. To do so,
one can proceed in two different directions:
1. One can try and suppress their quantistic “side-effects” and reduce the quan-
tum system to a classical one, or
2. One can use these quantistic “side-effects” and try to create something new.
Luckily, quantum systems possess some properties that help us in the encoding
of their states in bits. For example, when we measure the spin of an electron we
find that it can have two possible values: spin-up and spin-down.1 If a quantum
system has two states it can be used to encode the values 0 and 1. If the system
used to represent the qubit is a quantum system it will be called qubit.
3.2.1 Representing a qubit.
As we will see later on, in quantum mechanics, to each physical system is associated
a proper vector space where an inner product is possible and where each vector
represents a possible state of the system. Qubits are no exception, their states
are representet via vectors in such a space. In quantum mechanics, instead of
the standard geometric notation, is used a notation first introduced by the British
physicist Paul Dirac. This notation is called Dirac Notation or bra-ket notation.
The inner product in this notation is represented by a 〈bra|c|ket〉:
〈ϕ|ψ〉
made from a left side 〈ϕ| called bra and a right side |ψ〉 called ket.
To better understand the Dirac Notation I find it useful to start from the
standard concept of a vector in a three dimensional euclidean space where a vector
~v is a geometric entity endowed with magnitude and direction. As it is well known,
if we have a Cartesian reference system consisting of the three axes x, y and z where
~i, ~j and ~k are their relative unit vectors, each vector ~v can be expressed as a linear
combination of these three unit vectors:
~v = a~i+ b~j + c~k where a, b, c ∈ R
1When the spin is parallel to the measurement axis it is called spin-up and it is called spin-
down when it is not.
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In this way we can identify a vector by three numbers which can be represented
as a column – or row – matrix. The three unit vectors are represented by the
following matrices:
~i =
10
0
 ~j =
01
0
 ~k =
00
1

and for a generic vector ~v we have:
~v = a~i+ b~j + c~k = a
10
0
+ b
01
0
+ c
00
1
 =
ab
c

Each row in the matrix represents a dimension and the multiplication factor
of the unit vector which represents that dimension. Vector spaces in quantum
mechanics are a simple generalization of the vector space concept in the Euclidean
geometry, where:
1. The number of dimensions is not limited to only three, but it can be any
number. In quantum mechanics the number of dimensions can even be infi-
nite.
2. The multiplying factors are not limited to real numbers – n ∈ R – but are
complex ones; in mathematical terms one can say that in quantum mechanics
one deals with complex vector spaces and not with real ones.
Starting from the properties of the Euclidean space one can derive the axioms
that define the notion of complex vector space (which in quantum mechanics is
represented with kets):
1. |α〉+ |β〉 = |β〉+ |α〉
2. (|α〉+ |β〉) + |γ〉 = |α〉+ (|β〉+ |γ〉)
3. ∃0, |α〉+ 0 = |α〉 where 0 represents the vector with a length equal to 0.
4. ∃ |−α〉 , |α〉+ |−α〉 = 0
5. a (|α〉+ |β〉) = a |α〉+ a |β〉
6. (a+ b) |α〉 = a |α〉+ b |α〉
7. a (b |α〉) = ab |α〉
8. |−α〉 = −1 |α〉
Each vector space can be associated in a one-to-one correspondence with a dual
space. In the Dirac Notation a vector belonging to the dual space is represented
by a bra. In order to efficiently operate in the vector space using the rules with
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which one operates on matrices a ket is represented by a column matrix whilst a
bra is represented by a row matrix. To each ket:
|ψ〉 =

c1
c2
...
cn

corresponds the bra:
〈ψ| = [c∗1 c∗2 · · · c∗n]
where c∗i is the complex conjugate of ci. The inner product of the kets |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉
in the Dirac Notation is the moltiplication of the matrix that represents the bra
corresponding to the first ket with the matrix that represents the second ket:
|ψ〉  |ϕ〉 = 〈ψ|ϕ〉
and it has the following properties:
1. 〈β|c1α1 + c2α2〉 = c1 〈β|α1〉+ c2 〈β|α2〉
2. 〈β|α〉∗ = 〈α|β〉
3. 〈α|α〉 ≥ 0 e 〈α|α〉 = 0⇔ |α〉 = 0
The norm of the vector:
|ψ〉 =

c1
c2
...
cn

is defined as:
‖ψ‖ =
√
〈ψ|ψ〉 = √c∗1c1 + c∗2c2 + · · ·+ c∗ncn = √|c1|2 + |c2|2 + · · ·+ |cn|2
As one can see, the norm of a vector is a non negative real number, as one expects
a length to be. In quantum mechanic the states of a system are represented by
unit vectors:
‖ψ‖ =
√
〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1
or rather:
|c1|2 + |c2|2 + · · ·+ |cn|2 = 1
which in the case of a single qubit system is translated in:
‖ψ‖ = |a|2 + |b|2 = 1
Using matrices, we have that the inner product of:
|ψ〉 =
[
a
b
]
with |ϕ〉 =
[
c
d
]
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is:
〈ψ|ϕ〉 = [a∗ b∗] [c
d
]
= a∗c+ b∗d
Another way to represent a qubit is the Bloch Sphere, but for the purpose of
this thesis it is not a helpful concept. For more information regarding the Dirac
Notation or the Bloch Sphere one can read [40] and [48].
3.2.2 Properties of Qubits.
In this section we’ll give a brief explanation of some fundamental properties of
qubits. As mentioned before, a qubit is very different from a classical bit and here
are some of the reasons why:
1. The state of a qubit is a vector.
As we saw before, a qubit is associated to an abstract two-dimensional vector
space. Therefore the states of a base are two and are indicated – by analogy
with the classical bits – with the kets |0〉 and |1〉 which – from a physical
point of view – may correspond to the spin-up or spin-down of a particle.
The state of a qubit is represented by a unit vector belonging to such space:
|ψ〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉
where a and b are complex numbers – a, b ∈ C – such that ||a||2 + ||b||2 = 1.
One must not confuse the state |0〉 with the vector 0 which does not represent
a state.
2. The amount of information obtainable from a qubit is the same as
the amount of information obtainable from a classical bit.
The quantity of possible states of a qubit is infinite because such is the
quantity of the possible linear combinations of its base states. The coefficients
a and b are complex numbers of infinite precision so, apparently, the state
of a qubit contains an infinite quantity of information, information which
is “hidden”, not accessible in any way. In fact, when one tries to make a
measurement of the state of the qubit the result is reduced to one of the two
possible states: |0〉 or |1〉. In other words, from the measurement of the state
of a qubit one can have as a result the values:
• 0 with a probability of ||a||2
• 1 with a probability of ||b||2
Holevo’s theorem – [47], section 11.6 – gives further proof of the fact that the
amount of information obtainable from a qubit is the same as the amount of
information obtainable from a classical bit.
3. Quantum entanglement.
A system of more than one qubit may exhibit the phenomenon known as
Qauntum Entanglement. The entanglement is a property which allows the
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state of a qubit to influence the state its entangled qubit. For example, a
possible state |ψ〉 of two entangled qubits may be:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉
or
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
|01〉+ 1√
2
|10〉
In the case a measurement should be made on the first qubit and its state is
|0〉 one would know that the state of the second qubit will be |0〉 in the first
case and |1〉.
3.3 Some helpful concepts.
In this section we will briefly introduce – as the title says – some helpful concepts
for a better understanding of the last part of this thesis.
3.3.1 Fermat’s last theorem.
Fermat’s last theorem asserts that there exist no three integers a, b, c that satisfy
the equation:
an + bn = cn
for every n > 2. Fermat did not give any proof for all the numbers but only for
one case: n = 4.
The equation an+bn = cn is an example of a Diophantine equation. A Diophan-
tine equation is a polynomial equation the variables of which can only be integer
numbers. While analyzing a Diophantine equation some of the questions that are
usually asked are:
1. Are there any solutions?
2. If some solutions have been already found, can we find any more solutions?
3. Is there a finite or an infinite quantity of solutions?
4. Is it possible to find all the solutions?
5. Are the solutions of the equation computable?
In the year 1900 Hilbert gave a list of 23 mathematical problems which were
not solved until then. The computability of all the Diophantine equations was
the 10-th problem in that list.2 In the year 1970 Yuri Matiyasevich gave proof
of the non-computability of this problem. Afterwards, Hilary Putnam and other
authors gave proof that each recursively enumerable set was a Diophantine set,
result known as the Matiyasevich theorem.
2That is why this problem is usually referred to as Hilbert’s tenth problem.
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3.3.2 Linear operators.
A linear operator in a vector space V is a function Ω : V → V with the following
properties:
1. Ω(α |V 〉) = αΩ |V 〉
2. (〈V |α)Ω = 〈V |Ωα
3. Ω(α |Vi〉+ β |Vj〉) = αΩ |Vi〉+ βΩ |Vj〉
4. (〈Vi|α + 〈Vj| β)Ω = 〈Vi|Ωα + 〈Vj|Ωβ
These operators are usually representated by matrices.
Sometimes, by applying a linear operator to a vector |v〉 we obtain a multiple
of this vector, that is:
Ω |v〉 = ω |v〉
where:
• Ω is the linear operator
• ω is a scalar.
An example of such a situation may be:
Ω |V 〉 =
[
0 3
3 0
] [
2
2
]
=
[
0 · 2 + 3 · 2
3 · 2 + 0 · 2
]
=
[
6
6
]
= 3 ·
[
2
2
]
= 3 |V 〉
In these cases |v〉 is an eigenvector of Ω with an eigenvalue equal to ω.
Given a linear operator Ω one can give proof that there is only one operator Ω†
such that:
〈ϕ|Ωψ〉 = 〈Ω†ϕ|ψ〉
Ω† is the adjoint operator of Ω.3 An operator Ω which is equal to its adjoint
operator – Ω = Ω† – is a self-adjoint operator or Hermitian operator. In the case
of a Hermitian operator we have that:
〈ϕ|Ωψ〉 = 〈Ωϕ|ψ〉 = 〈ϕ|Ω|ψ〉
The eigenvalues of Hermitian operators are all real values. For each measurable
physical quantity of a system there is a Hermitian operator in the vector space
associated with that system and the eigenvalues of such operator represent the
possible results returned by a measurement of the corresponding physical quantity.
The states that are eigenvectors of a Hermitian operator are also called eigen-
states of that operator. The eigenstates of a Hermitian operator corresponding to
distinct eigenvalues are orthogonal between them.4
3In the case of matrices, the matrix A† is the conjugate trasposed of the matrix A. For further
concepts regarding matrices refer to Appendix ??.
4If the inner product of two vectors |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 is null – 〈ϕ|ψ〉 = 0 – then these vectors are
orthogonal between them.
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The measuring of a physical quantity makes the system go from the state |ψ〉
– in which the system was right before the measuring operation – to one of the
states |ϕi〉 – which are eigenvectors of the operator associated to that particular
physical quantity – with a probability of || 〈ϕi|ψ〉 ||2. For example, if we measure
the value of a qubit which is in a state |ψ〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉 its state will become one
of the following:
• |0〉 with a probability of || 〈0|ψ〉 ||2 = ||a||2
• |1〉 with a probability of || 〈1|ψ〉 ||2 = ||b||2
because |0〉 and |1〉 are orthogonal.
For more information regarding the subject one can consult [30], [40] and [38].
3.3.3 Tensor Product.
As we saw, a qubit can be described by a two-dimensional vector space. To a n
qubit system is associated a 2n dimensional space which is the result of the tensor
product of the n two-dimensional spaces of the respective qubits.
The tensor product – indicated with the symbol ⊗ – of two vector spaces Hn1
and Hm2 gives as a result the space H
n×m
3 :
H3 = H1 ⊗H2
The quantum gates and the quantum operators of H3 will be represented by square
matrices with dimensions n ·m× n ·m.
Let’s make an example: To a 2-qubit system is associated a vector space of
2 · 2 = 4 dimensions. The quantum operators and the quantum gates of this
system will be represented by 4× 4 matrices. The matrix representing a quantum
operator of the space H3 – let’s say, ΩH3 – will be the result of the tensor product
between the matrix representing ΩH1 and the matrix representing ΩH2 :
ΩH3 = ΩH1 ⊗ ΩH2
Let us suppose that Ω is the NOT operator. In this case we would have that:
NOTH3 = NOTH1 ⊗NOTH2 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
⊗
[
0 1
1 0
]
=

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

One can find a brief explanation of the tensor product of matrices in Appendix
B of the present work.
3.3.4 Fock space.
The Fock space is defined as the resulting vector space H of the sum of the tensor
product of the vector spaces associated to single particle systems:
Fv(H) =
∞⊕
i=0
SvH
⊗n = C⊕H ⊕ (Sv (H ⊗H))⊕ (Sv (H ⊗H ⊗H))⊕ . . .
where:
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• Sv is the operator which symmetrizes or antisymmetrizes a tensor.5
• C represents the states of no particles.
• H represents the state of one particle.
• Sv(H ⊗ · · · ⊗H) represents the states of n particles.
A generic state |Ψ〉 in FvH is given by:
|Ψ〉 = ψ0 ⊕ |ψ1〉 ⊕ |ψ11, ψ12〉 ⊕ . . .
where:
• ψ0 is a complex number.
• |ψ1〉 ∈ H
• |ψ11, ψ12〉 ∈ Sv(H ⊗H), etc.
The inner product 〈Ψ|Φ〉v in Fv(H) is defined as:
〈Ψ|Φ〉v = ψ∗0φ0 + 〈ψ1|φ1〉+ 〈ψ11, ψ12|φ11, φ12〉+ . . .
where the inner products on each of the n-particle Hilbert spaces are used. The
basis of a Fock space is made of the Fock states, which can be described as elements
of a Fock space with a well-defined number of particles. For a more in-depth
explanation of the Fock spaces one can consult [38].
3.3.5 The Schrödinger equation and the Hamiltonian oper-
ator.
The evolution over time of a closed quantum system – the one which occurs when
the system, after its initial preparation, is retained isolated from the external envi-
ronment and is not subjected to measurement – is given by a differential equation,
the fundamental equation of quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation:
i~
∂ |ψ(t)〉
∂t
= Hˆ |ψ(t)〉
where ~ is the Planck constant and Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the system. The
Hamiltonian – or Hamiltonian operator – is a hermitian operator which corresponds
to the total energy of the system. The eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian are the
possible values of the energy of the system.
As one can notice, given the fact that ~ and i are constants and having the
state |ψ(t0)〉 of the system in the initial time t0, the evolution of the system in
time – the state |ψ(t)〉 of each following instant – is uniquely determined by the
Hamiltonian Hˆ. As the laws of Newton for classical mechanics, the Hamiltonian
allows us – given the initial conditions – to predict the behaviour of an isolated
dynamic system.
5Depending on the type of particle.
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An isolated system that is in an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian stays in that over
time. For this reason the eigenstates of the Hamiltonian are also called stationary
states.
In most cases, even the evolution over time of a not isolated system can be
described by the Schrödinger equation. In this case the Hamiltonian – instead
of being a determined operator for that system – will be an operator Hˆ(t) which
varies with time.
A more exhaustive explanation of the topic can be found in [48] and [40].
3.3.6 Adiabatic Theorem.
The phrase Adiabatic Process is used in thermodynamics to indicate those processes
during which there is no heat exchange between the system and the environment
which surrounds it. This happens when the system evolves much faster than the
surrounding environment. In quantum mechanics the phrase is used to indicate
processes during which the Hamiltonian Hˆ(t) of the system varies very slowly,
infinitely slowly.
One should notice that if an operator is time-dependent its eigenstates and
eigenvalues will also be time-dependent. If a system with a time-dependent Hamil-
tonian Hˆ(t) is in an eigenstate |ψ(t0)〉 of its Hamiltonian – in an initial time
indicated with t0 – Hˆ(t0) we can ask in what state |ψ(t1)〉 will the system be in
a following time t1 and if that state will still be an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian
Hˆ(t1). Usually this does not occur, unless the system evolves according to an
adiabatic process.
According to the Adiabatic Theorem, a system which – in a point-in-time t0 –
is in an eigenstate |ψ(t0)〉 of the Hamiltonian Hˆ(t0) with an eigenvalue E(t0) will
be – in a point-in-time t1 – in the corresponding eigenstate |ψ(t1)〉 of Hˆ(t1) if the
Hamiltonian varies slowly enough, that is if dH
dt
is small enough and if the initially
distinct eigenvalues of Hˆ remain that way. For the theorem to be true it is also
required that the first and second derivates of the instantaneous eigenvectors with
respect to time must be well defined and piecewise continuous.
. . . if we take a quantum system whose Hamiltonian slowly changes from
H1 to H2, then, under certain conditions on H1 and H2, the ground
(lowest energy) state of H1 gets transformed to the ground state of H2.
[2]
A more in-depth explanation of the topic can be found in [25], [3] and [2].
3.4 Adiabatic Quantum Computing.
In this section we will talk about a hypercomputational quantum computer. As
we will see later, this is a probabilistic computer, given the fact that it is based on
the adiabatic theorem. Like anything new – quite rightly, i would dare say – it has
raised many criticisms and objections in the scientific world, some of which will be
seen further ahead in the present work.
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For the introduction of the model we will take as reference the work of the
creator of the model himself, in particular to his papers: [24] and [25].
3.4.1 The Adiabatic Quantum Computer.
The Adiabatic Quantum Computer (AQC) was introduced for the first time in [16]
and then it was resubmitted, with some differences, by Kieu. The idea behind
the model is to encode the solution of a problem in the ground state |gF 〉 of an
appropriate Hamiltonian HF . However, since this state is very difficult to achieve,
the system is prepared in a more feasible ground state |gI〉 of another Hamiltonian
HI and then this Hamiltonian is slowly turned in the wanted Hamiltonian HF ,
according to the formula:
H
(
t
T
)
=
(
1−− t
T
)
HI +
t
T
HF
where T is the time needed for the transformation of HI in HF .
According to the adiabatic theorem, if the time T used to transform HI in HF
compared to the inner time scale of the system is long enough, it is very likely that
the initial state will evolve in the desired state.6
3.4.2 The solution to the Hilbert’s tenth problem.
Let us consider the following Diophantine equation:
(x+ 1)3 + (y + 1)3 + (z + 1)3 + cxyz = 0 (3.1)
where:
• c ∈ Z
• x, y, z unknown
Is it possible to know if the equation has any integer solution? In [25] the author
introduces a decision algorithm which, given a Diophantine equation, should be
able to answer the before-mentioned question.
The author states that to have a solution at the before-mentioned problem one
must implement a Fock space. In that space must be created the Hamiltonian
which corresponds to (3.1):
HP =
((
a†xax + 1
)3
+
(
a†yay + 1
)3
+
(
a†zaz + 1
)3
+ c
(
a†xax
) (
a†yay
) (
a†zaz
))2
(3.2)
The operators Nj = a†ja have non-negative integer eigenvalues nj. The ground
state |g〉 of HP has the following properties:
• Nj |g〉 = nj |g〉
6Saying it differently: The greater the time available, the greater the probability for the
transformation to be successful.
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• HP |g〉 =
(
(nx + 1)
3 + (ny + 1)
3 + (nz + 1)
3 + cnxnynz
)2 |g〉 ≡ Eg |g〉 for some
(nx, ny, nz)
The answer to the decision problem will be given by the projective measurement
of the energy Eg of the state |g〉. If Eg = 0 then the Diophantine equation has at
least one integer solution, otherwise it does not have any integer solutions.
The algorithm can be summarized in:
1. Implement the Hamiltonian
HP =
(
D
(
a†1a1, . . . , a
†
nan
))2
corresponding to a Diophantine equation with n unknowns
D (x1, . . . , xn) = 0
in an appropriate Fock space.
2. If the ground state can be obtained with a high probability and can be viri-
fied, the measurement of some observables will give the answer to the decision
problem.
For more information regarding the topic one can consult [25].
3.4.3 Critics to the model.
There have been quite a few critics to Kieu’s Adiabatic Quantum Computing model
in the scientific community. These critics can be roughly divided in two groups:
• Critics to the algorithm.
• Critics to its feasibility.
The objections regarding its feasibility refer to the fact that the model is based
on an infinite Fock space. The Hamiltonians of these spaces can not be built as it
is not possible to make measurements with infinite precision. Regarding the other
category of objections – the critics to the algorithm – there is still a debate on its
correctness going on.
This model is in contrast with what was claimed by D. Deutsch regarding
the computing power of a quantum computer. According to Deutsch, a quantum
computer calculates the same class of function of a TM, even though it does it much
more efficiently and much more rapidly.7 This model, unlike the model presented
by David Deutsch in [13], is based on Hamiltonians of infinite dimensions – which
operate in a Fock space – and the properties of their ground states.
7A quantum computer can calculate, in a reasonable time, functions that are intractable for
a TM.
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In [1] the authors demonstrate that the AQC is equivalent – in terms of calculat-
ing power – to the standard quantum computing.8 This demonstration, however,
is only valid for Hilbert spaces of finite dimensions. The hypercomputability of the
AQC is based on its probabilistic nature and on the fact that it works on spaces
of infinite dimensions.
In [21] the authors point out another problem:
[ . . . ] the fact that the global minimum for the ‘computed’ function
exists by construction (which ensures a non–zero energy gap and hence
a finite evolution time) is of no consequence. Rather, it is the fact that
this finite time is unbounded which kills the algorithm. And since Kieu,
while guaranteeing that the brute–force search will eventually halt, fails
to supply a criterion that would allow one to identify whether or not the
algorithm has halted on the global minimum, the whole construction,
despite his aspirations, lacks the ability to identify a global minimum
as such.The problem is thus no different than any other corresponding
classical case of undecidability, and quantum mechanics adds nothing
to its solution. [21]
Put another way, the gist behind the adiabatic algorithm is that after
a sufficiently long evolution time, one is certain to have retrieved the
correct result of the decision problem just by performing a measurement
on the ground state. However, when the evolution time is unknown, a
non–zero energy reading upon a measurement of a final state can be
interpreted in two very different ways. On one hand, it may be said to
be an eigenvalue of an excited state. In such case, clearly, the evolution
was non–adiabatic, hence one must iterate the algorithm with another,
longer, evolution time. On the other hand, it may be said to be an
eigenvalue of the ground state. In such case, clearly, the algorithm has
performed correctly and one has a (negative) answer to the decision
problem. But since one cannot check a negative answer to a classically
undecidable problem, how can one tell, without knowing T in advance,
that this negative ‘answer’ is indeed correct, that is, that no iterations
are needed anymore? Without a criterion for distinguishing a ground
state from all other excited states which is independent of the knowledge
of the adiabatic evolution time T , one simply can’t. [21]
The fundamental problem is to be able to determine if the answer given by the
machine is correct. In fact – like in the Halting problem – if the answer is positive,
if the Diophantine equation has a solution, it is easy to verify. If, on the other
hand, the answer is negative, one can not be sure of the correctness of that answer.
On this aspect Kieu replies:
The fact that our algorithm is “only” probabilistically correct can be
understood as a necessity and a consistency condition when the out-
comes of such an algorithm cannot, in principle, be verified by any
8To the model presented by Deutsch.
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other means. The algorithm gives the k-tuple at which the square of a
Diophantine polynomial assumes it smallest value. While the existence
of a solution can be verified by a simple substitution, the indication of
no solution cannot be verified by any other finite recursive means at all
– thus the need of some probability measure to quantify the accuracy
of the derived conclusion. However, it is important and useful that this
probability is not only known but can also be predetermined with an
arbitrary value in advance. [26]
For more information regarding the critics made to the model one can read [1],
[26], [27], [28], [21] and [42].
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Chapter 4
Conclusions.
In this thesis we have explored the key aspects of a relatively new field of study,
the field of Hypercomputation. We started with a thorough study and analysis
of the classical concept of computability and of the Church-Turing thesis to then
continue with a study of the concept of hypercomputation, the introduction of
some hypercomputational machines and a more thoroughly analysis of some of
those machines. We tried to focus on the aspect of their feasibility as well as on
their computational power.
As one can guess from the machines introduced in this thesis, hypercomputa-
tional machines can be divided in two main groups:
1. Machines which require the use of the mathematics of the continuum to be
described;
2. Machines which extend the behaviour of TMs accepting a discrete descrip-
tion.
Regarding the machines belonging to the first group there is a fundamental
problem, measuring with infinite precision.1
The machines belonging to the second group need to work on conditions dif-
ferent from those of a TM. Let’s make a brief recapitulation of the conditions on
which a TM works, described in more detail in 2.1:
1. A TM accepts input data only before the computation starts.
2. A TM follows a set of fixed rules during its computation.
3. If the computation of a TM returns a result, that result is obtained after a
finite amount of time and is unique.
Among these models exist some which are able to compute Supertasks, which
are – roughly speaking – an infinite amount of operations in a finite amount of time.
Between the model introduced in this thesis there are two which can compute these
tasks:
1See Scarpellini’s quote in section 2.1.
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• Accelerated Turing Machines (ATM).
• Malament-Hogarth Machines (MHM).
Obviously, every TM is subject to the laws of physics and for each of its com-
putations there are some limits over which the machine can not go beyond.2 These
limits indirectly set a time limit for each step of the computation of a TM. Nev-
ertheless, ATMs violate this limit. The study of these machines is interesting as
it gives us an idea of what is possible to calculate if one has the possibility to
compute supertasks.
As for the MHMs, according to modern physics, they do not violate any physical
limit and are perfectly feasible. The problem with these machines, as indicated also
in 2.3.6, is purely practical: finding two suitable space-time lines. A certain kind
of black holes have the necessary characteristics to allow the MHM’s computation
but even there some problems – practical and theoretical – arise.
The other hypercomputational machines introduced in this thesis violate at
least one of the before-mentioned conditions. If we violate the 1 condition we can
obtain the Coupled Turing Machines (CTM). This machine is hypercomputational
because it takes as input a continuous stream of data which is potentially random.
This randomness can make this machine not usable from a practical point-of-view.
What use does a machine for which is not known what it calculates have?
Trial-And-Error (TAE) machines violate the 3 condition as this machine gives
off an output before it computation has reached an end – if it ever reaches an end
– and may not be unique as the machine may “change its mind” after some time.
From a certain point-in-time the TAE machine will not “change its mind” anymore,
but this point-in-time is not known a priori. The feasibility of these machines is
not the real problem in this case, these machines do not violate any physical law.
If we are satisfied with a “possibly correct” answer and if we are willing to accept
a “more correct” last-minute answer then these machines are a viable alternative.
After the analysis of these hypercomputational machines we entered the com-
plex and counterintuitive realm of quantum computing where we saw the Adiabatic
Quantum Computer (AQC). As we mentioned previously, a Canadian company has
built the first commercial quantum computer based on this model. There are still
some debates on the truthfulness of the statements of the company, that is if the
computer is a real quantum computer or not. In [25] the author presented an
algorithm which could solve the Hilbert’s tenth problem using the AQC. This al-
gorithm aroused quite some interest in the scientific world and also a lot of critics.
This model is a probabilistic one and as such is able to give a partially correct
answer. Even though it can be arranged for the answer to be more or less correct –
depending on the conditions, we can have a correct answer with an arbitrary high
percentage of confidence – it can never be 100% correct. In this model is required
to work in infinite Fock spaces and this fact has attracted quite some critics. As if
that were not enough, the probabilistic nature of the model was not of any help,
on the contrary it gave rise to quite some debates.
2Some of these limits are presented in section 1.4.
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Luckily, hypercomputation is a new field and surely many more ideas have yet
to be brought on the surface. We have also seen a few models of the human mind
based on some hypercomputers. Up until now it seems that to hypercompute we
have to give off the certainty of a correct result and be satisfied with a “probably
correct” result. Will it be possible to do more than this?
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Appendix A
Complex Numbers.
Complex numbers are an extension of real numbers. They are formed by two parts:
• Real
• Imaginary
A complex number c ∈ C is represented as:
c = a+ b · i
where:
• a, b ∈ R
• i =
√−1 is the imaginary unit
Complex numbers can be also seen as an ordered pair of real numbers (a, b).
In fact, complex numbers are in a two-way correspondece with the points of a
plane, also known as the Complex Plane. This plane is made of the real axis and
orthogonal imaginary axis.
The complex numbers have the following properties:
1. c+ c′ = (a, b) + (a′, b′) = (a+ a′, b+ b′)
2. c · c′ = (a, b) · (a′, b′) = (aa′ − bb′, ab′ + ba′)
3. |c| = √a2 + b2
4. The distance between two points in the complex plane is calculated by the
function: d(c, c′) = |c− c′|
5. The complex conjugate of c = a + bi is c∗ = a − bi and has the following
properties:
(a) (c1 + c2)∗ = c∗1 + c∗2
(b) (c1c2)∗ = c∗1c∗2
(c) (c1c−12 )∗ = (c1/c2)∗ = c∗1/c∗2
(d) (c∗)∗ = c
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(e) c∗ = c⇔ c ∈ R
(f) |c∗| = |c|
(g) |c|2 = c∗c
6. c−1 = |c|−2c∗ = c∗/|c|2
7. It is not possible to define an order for complex numbers. We can not have
c1 ≤ c2 ⇒ c1 + c3 ≤ c2 + c3 for the complex numbers as we have for the real
ones.
8. C is, at the same time, a one-dimensional complex vector space and a two-
dimensional real vector space. In addition to being a real vector space it is
also a normed vector space1 and a complete metric space.2. As such, it is also
a Hilbert space.
1A vector space where each vector has a defined norm, or length.
2A complete metric space is a metric space where every sequence of the form {xi|∀ >
0∃xj such that d(xi, xj) < } converge to an element of the space.[38]
Appendix B
Matrixes.
As it is well known, a matrix is a table of elements made of n rows and m columns.
A matrix A(n,m) has the following form:
A(n,m) =

a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,m
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1 an,2 · · · an,m

The element indicated as aij is the element that is found in the row i and
the column j. Matrices can be used to represent vectors. In fact, vectors can be
considered as simple matrices with a single row or with a single column. A matrix
1×m is called row matrix whereas a matrix n× 1 is called column matrix.
Different operations are possible between matrices:
1. Sum of matrices. The sum between matrices – let us say matrix A and
matrix B – is possible only between matrices with the same number of rows
n and the same number of columns m. The resulting matrix C will also have
n rows and m columns. Each element ci,j will be the result of the sum of the
elements ai,j and bi,j:
C = A+B =

a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,m
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1 an,2 · · · an,m
+

b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,m
b2,1 b2,2 · · · b2,m
...
... . . .
...
bn,1 bn,2 · · · bn,m

C =

a1,1 + b1,1 a1,2 + b1,2 · · · a1,m + b1,m
a2,1 + b2,1 a2,2 + b2,2 · · · a2,m + b2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1 + bn,1 an,2 + bn,2 · · · an,m + bn,m

2. Direct sum between matrices. The result of the direct sum of the matrix
A(n,m) with the matrix B(p,q) is the matrix C(n+p,m+q) made in the following
way:
C = A⊕B =
[
A 0
0 B
]
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In general we have that:
n⊕
i=1
Ai =

A1 0 · · · 0
0 A2 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · An

3. Multiplication. In the case of multiplication we may have two cases:
(a) Multiplication with a scalar. If B(n,m) is the result of the multipli-
cation of the matrix A(n,m) with a scalar k then the element bi,j will be
equal to the multiplication of the element ai,j with k:
B = k · A = k

a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,m
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1 an,2 · · · an,m
 =

ka1,1 ka1,2 · · · ka1,m
ka2,1 ka2,2 · · · ka2,m
...
... . . .
...
kan,1 kan,2 · · · kan,m

(b) Multiplication between matrices. The multiplication of a matrix
A(n,p) with a matrix B(p,m) results in the matrix C(n,m).1 Each element
ci,j will be equal to the sum of the product of each element in the row i
of the matrix A with each element of the column j of the matrix B. In
other words:
ci,j =
n−1∑
l=0
ai,lbl,j = ai,1b1,j + ai,2b2,j + · · ·+ ai,nbn,j
This case includes also the multiplication of a matrix A(n,m) with a vector
~v represented by a column matrixm×1. In this case, the resulting vector
~r will have the components:
ri =
m∑
j=1
ai,jvj = ai,1v1 + ai,2v2 + · · ·+ ai,mvm
(c) Matrix product (in terms of inner product).
C = A ·B =

a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,m
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1 an,2 · · · an,m
 ·

b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,m
b2,1 b2,2 · · · b2,m
...
... . . .
...
bn,1 bn,2 · · · bn,m

C =

a1,1b1,1 a1,2b1,2 · · · a1,mb1,m
a2,1b2,1 a2,2b2,2 · · · a2,mb2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1bn,1 an,2bn,2 · · · an,mbn,m

1The resulting matrix will have the number of rows of the first matrix and the number of
columns of the second matrix. The number of columns of the first matrix must be equal to the
number of rows of the second matrix.
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(d) Matrix tensor product. This product is indicated with the symbol
⊗ and the resulting matrix C(n×k,m×p) of A(n,m) ⊗B(k,p) is:
C = A⊗B =

a1,1B a1,2B · · · a1,mB
a2,1B a2,2B · · · a2,mB
...
... . . .
...
an,1B an,2B · · · an,mB

4. Matrix transposition. The transposed of matrix A(n,m) is the matrix AT(m,n)
where the element ai,j of AT is equal to the element aj,i of A:
AT =

a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,m
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,m
...
... . . .
...
an,1 an,2 · · · an,m

T
=

a1,1 a2,1 · · · am,1
a1,2 a2,2 · · · am,2
...
... . . .
...
a1,n a2,n · · · am,n

For example, let us consider the matrix:
A =
[
4 7 1
0 5 3
]
Its transposed will be:
AT =
4 07 5
1 3

In the case of a matrix made of complex numbers – a complex matrix –
we can talk about its transposed conjugate. The transposed conjugate of a
complex matrix A is indicated with A† and is build by transposing A and
replacing each element with its complex conjugate. If A is equal to A† then
we have a Hermitian matrix. An example of a Hermitian matrix would be:
A = A† = (A∗)T =
 1 2 + i −i2− i 5 −3 + 7i
i −3− 7i 0

Some of the properties of these matrices are:
(a) (A†)† = A
(b) (A+B)† = A† +B†
(c) (cA)† = c∗ · A† dove c ∈ C
(d) (A ·B · · · · )† = · · · ·B† · A†
For more information regarding the topic one may consult [30].
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